by F. Michael Maloof

WASHINGTON – While Iran swears it doesn’t have nuclear weapons, the
Western thinking that it’s working on such a program despite crippling
sanctions of questionable results is having the effect of enhancing the
Islamic republic’s international stature, according to a report from
Joseph Farah’s G2 Bulletin.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory, gives
members the right to enrich uranium for fuel reactors and use for
medical research, among other civilian uses.
The NPT doesn’t preclude the possibility Iran or any other NPT
signatory or member of the International Atomic Energy Agency could
build the components to make a nuclear weapon, without actually putting
the components together to make one.
The question of the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program –
absent firm intelligence – helps Iran leave open the possibility that
such a program exists and that it could possess the means to build a
nuclear bomb rapidly, without actually having such a program, analysts
say.
To these analysts, this approach has allowed Iran to rub shoulders
with the “big boys” – the P5+1, or United Nations Security Council
members of the permanent five of the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Russia and China plus Germany.
In pressing its right under the NPT to enrich uranium despite
sanctions, Iran actually has gained considerable concessions, and is
able to meet with the members. It also has been successful at meetings
to kick the proverbial can down the road – to get the P5+1 members to
agree to meet again. This has bought Iran more time for developing its
nuclear program – the West, including Israel, believe.
And this is where the U.S. and Israel disagree – the U.S., unlike
Israel, doesn’t believe that Iran has achieved the technological
breakthrough to make a nuclear weapon, let alone the capability of
placing it on a missile requiring additional technology know-how that
Iran isn’t yet assessed to possess. On the other hand, Israel believes
Iran is only months away of such breakthroughs.
The heart of the problem, according to analysts, appears to be the exchange of rhetoric between Israel and Iran.
According to George Friedman of the open intelligence group Stratfor,
Israel – and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular –
looks on Iran as an irrational actor and that armed with a nuclear
weapon it would act irrationally and make every effort to destroy Israel.
While Iran has expressed what Friedman says is irrational rhetoric,
Iran actually has been cautious in its actions, “engaging instead in
reckless rhetoric.”
Given this fundamental difference in perceptions, Israel believes it
is intolerable for Iran to have nuclear weapons in a mutually assured
destruction, or MAD, relationship, similar to what worked during the
Cold War between the then-Soviet Union and the United States and its
allies.
All of this assumes that Iran indeed is embarked on a nuclear weapons
program. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a
fatwa, or religious edict, saying that its nuclear development program
is not intended to make a nuclear weapon.
Given Iran’s irrational talk about Israel’s destruction, however,
Netanyahu firmly believes that such irrational Iranian talk means that
the Islamic republic indeed is embarked on developing a nuclear weapon
and actually intends to use it against Israel.
Israel, however, appears divided on this issue. Netanyahu’s view that
Iran is an irrational actor is contrary to the assessment of his own
military and intelligence chiefs.
Given Netanyahu’s prevalent thinking, the notion of MAD won’t work.
Any actual Israeli military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities,
analysts suggest, actually could accelerate an Iranian effort to turn
its nuclear program into developing nuclear weapons.
This prospect has been reinforced by separate research that showed
the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor actually pushed
then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to try to make nuclear weapons.
Yet, Israel hasn’t taken action, claiming it is waiting for the U.S. to join it in destroying Iran’s nuclear sites.
In looking at a years-long rhetorical exchange between Israel and
Iran, Friedman lays out their respective strategies in his recent
article, “War and Bluff: Iran, Israel and the United States.”
He states:
“Up to this point, the Iranians have not even fielded a device for
testing, let alone a deliverable weapon. For all their activity, either
their technical limitations or a political decision has kept them from
actually crossing the obvious redlines and left Israel trying to define
some developmental redline.
“Iran’s approach has created a slowly unfolding crisis, reinforced by
Israel’s slowly rolling response. For its part, all of Israel’s
rhetoric – and periodic threats of imminent attack – has been going on
for several years, but the Israelis have done little beyond some cover
and cyberattacks to block the Iranian nuclear program. Just as the gap
between Iranian rhetoric and action has been telling, so, too, has the
gap between Israeli rhetoric and reality. Both want to appear more
fearsome than either is actually willing to act.
“The Iranian strategy has been to maintain ambiguity on the status of
its program, while making it appear that the program is capable of
sudden success – without ever achieving that success. The Israeli
strategy has been to appear constantly on the verge of attack without
ever attacking and to use the United States as its reason for
withholding attacks, along with the studied ambiguity of the Iranian
program. The United States, for its part, has been content playing the
role of holding Israel back from an attack that Israel doesn’t seem to
want to launch. The United States sees the crumbling of Iran’s position
in Syria as a major Iranian reversal and is content to see this play out
alongside sanctions.”
Iran, however, has dispersed its nuclear program around the country
to the point that any military attack may produce questionable results
unless Israel uses some exotic weapon, such as an electromagnetic pulse
from a high-altitude nuclear explosion over central Iran. That would
affect all electronics not only in Iran but the entire Middle East.
This approach, analysts say, would allow Israel to proceed with
bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities virtually without detection or
resistance.
Separately, WND/G2Bulletin recently reported that an EMP attack is one option Israel is considering.
Friedman says that while Israel on the surface has been driving U.S. policy, he said the reverse may be true.
“Israel has bluffed an attack for years and never acted. Perhaps now
it will act, but the risks of failure are substantial,” Friedman said.
“If Israel really wants to act, this is not obvious.
“Speeches by politicians do not constitute clear guidelines,” he
said. “If the Israelis want to get the United States to participate in
the attack, rhetoric won’t work. Washington wants to proceed by
increasing pressure to isolate Iran.
“Simply getting rid of a nuclear program not clearly intended to
produce a device is not U.S. policy,” he added. “Containing Iran without
being drawn into a war is. To this end, Israeli rhetoric is useful.”
Friedman sees Netanyahu’s rhetoric as actually aiding U.S. policy.
“Israel’s bellicosity is not meant to signal an imminent attack, but
to support the U.S. agenda of isolating and maintaining pressure on
Iran,” he said. “That would indicate more speeches from Netanyahu and
greater fear of war. But speeches and emotions aside, intensifying
psychological pressure on Iran is more likely than war.”